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Abstract 
 
The paper discusses an experience in using a real-
time UML/SysML profile and a formal verification 
toolkit to check a secure group communication system 
against temporal requirements. A generic framework is 
proposed and specialized for hierarchical groups.  
1. Introduction 
Secure Group Communication Systems, or SGCS 
for short, capture complex problems in terms of 
security, group management, and timeliness. Whether 
security protocol verification and group management 
have often been discussed – separately or not - in the 
literature, little work has been published on formal 
verification of SGCS against temporal requirements. 
The paper proposes a formal modeling and 
verification framework for checking an SGCS against 
temporal requirements. The proposed modeling 
language is TURTLE (Timed UML and RT-LOTOS 
Environment [2]), based on the Unified Modeling 
Language [14] and a subset of the System Modeling 
Language (SysML [11]). TURTLE adds a formal 
semantics to UML and SysML. It improves UML with 
powerful temporal operators and extends SysML with 
a language dedicated to temporal requirement 
expression. Also, TURTLE is supported by a toolkit 
which enables verification of distributed systems 
against temporal requirements.   
Without loss of generality, the paper discusses the 
use of TURTLE on a specific SGCS where group 
members are hierarchically organized. The running 
example raises usual security problems, such as “Who 
issues the cryptographic key and owns it?” Further, 
operations such as group merging and member 
reinsertion must be executed with hierarchical 
principles in mind. This makes our example original 
with respect to other systems published in the 
literature. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
surveys related work. Section 3 introduces the 
TURTLE modeling language and the formal 
verification tools. Section 4 identifies the main 
functions to be offered by an SGCS and depicts the 
results in terms of use-case diagrams. Section 5 
proposes a design architecture to model the previously 
identified functions. Section 6 focuses on the SGCS 
investigated in the framework of SAFECAST project 
[8]. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Related work 
2.1. Encryption keys 
SGCS commonly achieve data protection by using 
encryption keys [17] that may be asymmetric or 
symmetric.  
Asymmetric algorithms use a pair of public and 
private keys. Their application to SGCS is hampered 
by scalability problems (combinatory of keys) and by 
the complexity of the asymmetric encryption 
algorithms.  
Therefore, much work on SGCS implements 
symmetric algorithms with one group secret key shared 
by the group’s members (cf. the Diffie-Hellman’s 
algorithm [5] and its adaptation to groups). 
2.2. Examples of SGCS 
The Ensemble system [9] adds one security layer on 
top of former ISIS and HORUS group communication 
systems. Ensemble efficiently computes group keys, 
offers several security policies at the application level, 
and supports multiple partitioning. 
The Secure Spread [1] system implements five key 
generation protocols mostly based on Diffie-Hellman’s 
group protocol algorithm. The user selects one protocol 
depending on the security compromise algorithm that 
is acceptable to him/her. The weak point is that Secure 
Spread works only for servers that never fail. 
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2.3. Formal verification of security protocols 
So far, security protocols have essentially been 
verified using rewriting rule techniques. Examples of 
tools that use these techniques include CASRUL [4] 
and AVISPA [3]. Though powerful in detecting security 
flaws (in particular key management problems), these 
tools do not take time into account. On the opposite 
side, formal verification tools such as UPPAAL [15], 
TINA [12] and TTool-RTL [13] [10] use timed 
modeling techniques that enable formal verification of 
temporal properties.  
The remainder of this paper addresses TURTLE, the 
UML/SysML language supported by TTool-RTL. 
3. TURTLE  
The TURTLE modeling language adds formality to 
the Unified Modeling Language (UML [14]) and 
borrows the concept of requirement diagrams from the 
System Modeling Language (SysML [12]). Beyond 
formality, the strength of the language stems from its 
support by TTool [13], which is interfaced with the 
formal verification tools RTL [10] and CADP [16]. 
3.1. Modeling in TURTLE 
Modeling in TURTLE starts with a SysML-like 
requirement diagram where temporal requirements 
may be formally expressed and connected with 
verification results in order to achieve traceability.  
The output of the analysis phase is a use-case 
diagram which defines the boundary and main 
functionalities of the system. The use-cases are 
documented by sequence diagrams structured by an 
Interaction Overview Diagram. 
The design phase uses one class/object diagram to 
model the static architecture of the system and several 
activity diagrams to describe the inner workings of the 
objects. A class/objects diagram allows one to express 
synchronization, parallelism, sequencing and pre-
emption between pairs of objects. Also, TURTLE 
extends activity diagram with three temporal operators: 
a fixed delay, a time interval, and a time-limited offer 
(TURTLE objects indeed communicate by means of 
rendezvous offers). 
3.2 Use of formal verification tools 
The use of TURTLE tools may be sketched as 
follows. The designer first draws the requirement, 
analysis and design diagrams using TTool [13]. The 
RT-LOTOS code generator implemented by TTool 
translates the TURTLE model into a RT-LOTOS 
specification that may be verified by RTL (RT-LOTOS 
Laboratory [10]). For bounded systems of “reasonable” 
size, in particular the secure group communication 
system discussed in this paper, RTL generates a 
reachability graph that may be in turn minimized using 
CADP [16]. The later outputs a quotient automaton 
which gives an abstract view of the system’s behavior, 
focusing on the system’s actions which are of interest 
for the set of requirements to be verified. Note that 
RTL and CADP are invoked from TTool’s interface. 
Also, TTool indicates how the identifiers in the 
quotient automaton relate to the identifiers used in the 
TURTLE model. 
4. Analysis 
This section identifies the set of functions to be 
provided by a SGCS after an active session started, i.e. 
after each member in a group was attributed his/her 
rights. The procedures used to give members their 
rights and to set up groups are not discussed in this 
paper, since they capture weaker requirements in terms 
of interactivity and security. 
The TURTLE analysis model of an active session 
distinguishes between security and intra-group 
functions, respectively. Fig.1 and Fig.2 depict the 
corresponding use-case diagrams. The latter are 
documented by scenarios expressed in terms of 
sequence diagrams (not shown for space reasons). 
4.1. Structuring groups using roles 
The use of roles to structure groups was suggested 
by the necessity to describe hierarchically organized 
groups of Humans with clearly separate roles, as well 
as groups where all members have the same role. 
Each member participating to an active session has 
a Member role which grants him/her access to a set of 
predefined resources, rights and functions (Fig.2). One 
member plays a special role as he/she heads one or 
several groups. The so-called ChiefMember manages 
the group and knows its current status.  
During the key distribution phase, the Supervisor 
role is hold by the person who is responsible for 
creating and distributing the key. Meanwhile, other 
members keep the Member role. 
Groups’ composition dynamically evolves and roles 
are introduced to handle that dynamicity. The 
ConcernedMember role is given to one member who is 
ready to enter a group, to exit from his/her group, or to 
move up (down) in the hierarchy.  
The so-called Administrator owns the right to 
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exclude one member and to make one member move 
up or down in the hierarchy. The Administrator role 
may be held by any authorized person, in particular the 
group’s chief. 
Besides exclusion, a member may also leave contact 
with his/her group due to communication problems.  
Then he/she may ask permission to come back by 
playing the ConcernedMember role. 
Finally, two actors named SO_PMR and Group 
respectively model the communication medium and a 
set of members belonging to the same group. 
4.2. Group key management  
This section addresses access control mechanisms, 
source authentication mechanisms, integrity and 
confidentiality in data exchanges inside the same 
session. Again, groups may evolve dynamically. Also, 
for the functions identified in figure 1, group keys are 
symmetric. Asymmetric keys are used in other parts of 
the system that are not addressed in this paper.  
DistributeKey is the basic security function for 
distributing a previously generated symmetric key. The 
DistributeKeyPlane function specializes the 
distribution for groups with one hierarchy level. The 
DistributeKeyHierarchical function adapts the key 
distribution mechanisms for N-level hierarchical 
groups. Keys are generated in such a way lower-level 
(higher level) messages may (not) be understood. Lists 
of generated keys avoid the understanding of higher-
levels messages, whereas lower-level messages remain 
understandable. The RenewKeyHierarchical function 
supervises the key renewal process. 
UseCaseDiagram_GCKM package SFC_GCKM {1/1}
SFC_GCKM:GCKM 
DistributeKey
 
DistributeKeyPlane
 
DistributeKeyHierarchical
 
RenewMergedGroupKey
 
RenewKeyHierarchical
 
RenewPeriodicMergedGroup
 RenewBasePeriodicKey
 
<<include>> <<include>> <<include>>
 : Member
<<actor>>
Supervisor : GCKM
<<subject>>
 
Fig.1. Use-case diagram for security functions 
Security is improved by renewing keys on a 
periodic basis, and more precisely every N hours (this 
function is implemented by RenewBasePeriodicKey). 
Note that RenewMergedGroupKey and Renew 
PeriodicMergedGroup are left for further study. 
4.3. Intra-group functions 
The functions identified by the use-case diagram in 
Fig.2 manage one group from inside. Dynamicity is 
handled. 
UseCaseDiagram_GMM package SFC_GMM {1/2}
SFC_GMM:GMM 
ExcludeGroupMember
 
Downgrade
 
ConnectMember
 
Upgrade
 Reinstat
 
Join
 
Reconnect
 
Leave
 
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
<<extend>>
<<include>>
<<include>>
<<extend>>
 : Administrator
<actor>
 : ChiefMember
<actor>
 : ConcernedMember
<actor>
SO_PMR : Medium
<<actor>
 : Group
<actor>
 
Fig.2. Use-case diagram for intra group functions 
Basically, a member may join a group, leave it, and 
move up or down in the hierarchy. The Join, Leave, 
Upgrade, and DownGrade use-cases have been defined 
accordingly. Reconnect may be used in case of 
connection loss, and Reinstat further applies when the 
member had previously been excluded. The 
aforementioned functions use ConnectionMgtMember 
to make a member connect to one group. Finally, 
ExcludeGroupMember is used to exclude a member for 
ever. 
5. Design 
Previous section identified group key management 
and intra-group functions to be implemented by a 
hierarchically organized SGCS. That analysis is 
followed by a design step where the system’s 
architecture and the objects’ behaviors are defined. 
To our knowledge, no design pattern has so far been 
published for security systems [1]. In this paper, we 
propose the 4-layer architecture depicted by Fig.3. 
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Layers 1 and 2 handle secure communication 
operations. Layers 3 and 4 respectively manage 
communication keys and groups. The members 
connected to the system are located at the application 
layer. 
5.1. Secured broadcasting services 
The Medium layer offers elementary multipoint 
broadcasting functions. It implements three basic 
services: a point to point communication service, a 
multipoint service “1 to N” and a “1 to all” 
broadcasting service. 
The Security Operators layer, or SO for short, use 
hashing functions to guarantee integrity, encryption to 
achieve confidentiality, signature to guarantee 
authentication, and an index to prevent from replay and 
repudiation. 
5.2. Management services 
The Group Communication Key Management 
layer, or GCKM for short, manages session keys in 
order to make group communication secure. Key 
renewal includes key generation and distribution. One 
key is generated for one specific hierarchical level 
inside a communication group. Key renewal must 
always maintain the security properties of the system, 
even when the roles evolve or when one member enters 
(resp. exits) a group.  
Fig.3. Generic architecture 
The Group Membership Mechanisms, or GMM for 
short, manages groups. It controls their structure, their 
evolution and dynamicity. GMM includes the intra-
group functions identified in section 4.3. One service is 
created per function. The resulting set of services 
works using the underlying session key management 
mechanisms and the roles which grant rights to 
members. 
So far, discussion has not been targeted to a SGCS 
in particular. Next section discusses the use of 
TURTLE in the framework of SAFECAST project [8]. 
6. SAFECAST project  
The SAFECAST project [8] addresses secure group 
communication systems in the context of operation 
theatres where first-aid services, firemen, and 
policemen cooperate to achieve a security mission in 
common. The challenge is to create, dynamically make 
evolve, and command coherent groups of Humans, 
despite of heterogeneous origins and specific 
hierarchical rules. 
6.1. Architecture and mechanisms 
The architecture as well as the security and group 
management protocols developed in the framework of 
SAFECAST project have been proposed under the 
assumption that people engaged on operation theatres 
are equipped with mobile terminals that securely 
transmit voice and data over a multicast radio network 
(Private Mobile Radiocommunication, or PMR for 
short). Groups evolve dynamically, which makes 
online update of security elements a necessity. 
The most important mechanism implemented by the 
upper layer is session key management. The dynamic 
nature of the groups makes it necessary to manage keys 
using a cryptographic, symmetric, contributive and 
distributed algorithm.  Diffie-Hellman’s algorithm [5] 
has been extended to a group context. The algorithm is 
exclusively used by group chiefs to generate the 
session key. The latter is broadcasted to other 
members. The session key is used by the encryption 
and decryption operations implemented by the physical 
layer. The index used to prevent from replay contains 
each member’s identity.  
The project considers a radio medium with rate and 
range values that are common in ad-hoc PMR 
networks. The middle rate class has a 100 kb/s rate and 
a 100 km range. 
5.2. Verification against temporal requirements 
The SAFECAST system has been modeled in 
TURTLE relying on the architecture depicted by Fig.3. 
Groups include up to seven members. The TURTLE 
model includes eight security and group management 
functions (1. Key Generation and Distribution. 2. Join. 
3. Leave. 4. Reconnection. 5. Reinstallation. 6. 
Security Operators SO
Medium
Group Membership
Mechanisms
GMM
Group 
Communication 
Key 
Management
GCKM
User #1
Group Membership
Mechanisms
GMM
Group 
Communication 
Key 
Management
GCKM
User #2
Group Membership
Mechanisms
GMM
Group 
Communication 
Key 
Management
GCKM
User #N
…
Secure  multicast  services
Management  services
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Exclusion. 7. Upgrade. 8. Downgrade).  
The prime objective of modeling the SAFECAST 
system in TURTLE was to check the system against a 
set of temporal requirements which constraint security 
requirements. As suggested by Tab.1, examples of 
temporal requirements include the amount of time 
taken to set up a function, the user’s reaction time 
depending on the group’s configuration, and the 
amount of time allowed to detect that messages are not 
exchanged in a normal way.  
Each requirement is expressed in a SysML 
requirement diagram. A SysML requirement is a block 
[7] characterized by four attributes: (1) an identifier; 
(2) a text (an informal description of the requirement); 
(3) a type: “functional”, “non-functional”, or 
“performance”; (4) a risk level: “low” or “high”. 
Requirements are first expressed in an informal 
way. Formal requirements are then derived from the 
formal ones and expressed in a chronogram style, using 
a so-called “TRDD” (Timing Requirement Description 
Diagram). Fig.4 depicts an example for the following 
requirement: “Access Time for a Multimedia Group 
must remain below 350 ms”. The TRDD contains two 
observations points “Begin_MA” and “End_MA” that 
define the borders of the valid temporal interval (350 
ms). For a delay value ranging between 0 and 350 ms, 
the requirement is met (denoted by the OK interval). 
The delay values that exceed 350 ms correspond to a 
requirement violation (denoted by KO interval). 
The TRDDs serve as starting point for automatic 
requirement verification using the TURTLE toolkit [7]. 
 
Fig.4. Requirement Diagrams for Access Time for a 
Multimedia Group 
The multipoint broadcast radio PMR included in the 
SAFECAST system leads to work with time 
constraints ranging from milliseconds to hours. In 
Tab.1, duration is expressed in ms. 
First column in Tab.1 lists the requirements to be 
verified by the SAFECAST system. 
Second column in Tab.1 associates an upper 
temporal bound with each requirement. The eight 
subsequent columns list the functions investigated for 
the middle-rate radio network (100 kb/s).   
Letters T and F respectively indicate whether a 
temporal requirement is satisfied or not. An empty box 
indicates that the requirement does not apply. For 
instance, on second line, the average delay for entering 
into an encrypted communication should remain lower 
than 1000 ms. The requirement applies to the Join, 
Reconnection and Reinstallation functions. We 
formally verified that the temporal requirement is met 
by the three functions. 
For each function, the TURTLE environment 
computed a duration that is indicated by the Duration 
obtained line. For instance the Key Generation and 
Distribution function takes 121 ms when it is 
implemented over the middle-rate PMR network.  
Tab.1.  Temporal Requirement verification results 
As shown by Tab.1, all the services but one meet 
their expected limit duration when the system is 
deployed over a middle-rate PMR network. The 
exception is multimedia access, for which downgrade 
and reinstat raise temporal violations. The reason is 
that the access time for a multimedia group must 
remain below 350 ms, whereas an upper bound of 
60 000 ms is accepted for text communications.  
Tab.1 indicates that both reinstat and downgrade 
have a total access time equal to 482 ms, which is not 
too far from 350 ms. The SAFECAST project partners 
agreed on relaxing temporal constraints without 
modifying the security protocols implemented to 
achieve security, authentication, confidentiality and no-
repudiation. 
7. Conclusions 
Secure group communication systems, or SGCS for 
short, capture complex design problems in terms of 
security flaws, group management, and timeliness. The 
SGCS designed in the framework of SAFECAST 
project further introduces hierarchically organized 
TRDD= TRDD_F_M_A_T 
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groups that must cooperate on the same operation 
theatre. 
The level of complexity reached by the 
SAFECAST SGCS has convinced the project’s 
partners to use formal modeling techniques and 
verification tools. The partners also agreed on the 
necessity to use two complementary verification tools. 
The AVISPA tool was selected to specifically address 
security issues. A security flaw was identified [3] and 
fixed. On the other hand, relying on former experience 
[6] in applying the TURTLE language and tools to 
security protocols, it was decided to use TURTLE to 
check the SAFECAST system against temporal 
requirements. It has been established that the 
SAFECAST SGCS does not work correctly over a 
low-rate PMR network. By contrast, the middle-rate 
PMR network is appropriate as soon as multimedia 
services are not implemented. This result has been of 
high importance in making design decisions for the 
final product. 
The modeling framework proposed in the paper is 
not limited to the SAFECAST system. The functions 
identified in Fig.1 and Fig.2 are generic, and so is the 
architecture depicted by Fig.3. These diagrams will be 
the starting point for further study on group key 
management mechanisms. Novel group merging and 
splitting operations are also to be investigated.  
Finally, the challenge in terms of verification tool is 
to cope with groups of hundreds - if not thousands - 
members. Recent work on translating TURTLE models 
into Time Petri Nets (instead of RT-LOTOS) will 
make it possible to interface TTool [13] and TINA [12] 
and thus to benefit from TINA’s performances. 
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